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INTRODUCTION
With citizenship comes certain rights: the right to vote,1 the
right to marry,2 and now, the individual right to bear arms—at
least the right to possess handguns for personal self-defense
purposes.3 The right to bear arms may be taken away, but that
is done either through a judicial determination of incompetency
or as a consequence to related or even unrelated occurrence of
criminal conviction.4 However, with the United States Supreme
Court’s recent application of the Second Amendment to the
states, having determined that the Second Amendment included
the individual right to possess handguns in one’s home for selfdefense purposes, that right to bear arms, left unclear, may do
more harm than good.5 The future of Second Amendment
litigation will be in challenging those laws that restrict rights of
gun ownership and use. Without a clear standard of review,6 it is
difficult to predict if many of the existing limitations in gun
control will survive challenges.
But case law does not live in a vacuum. One judgment,
addressing one right, can surely affect—or be affected by—
another judgment addressing a seemingly unrelated issue. This
occurs at the intersection of that right to bear arms and
intellectual disabilities.
Addressing the Eighth Amendment in 2002, the Supreme
Court, reversing precedent only thirteen years old, held that the
execution of persons with intellectual disabilities was a violation
of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and
1 Although the right to vote is not explicitly granted in the Constitution, the
Constitution does prohibit the denial of the right to vote based on race, U.S. CONST.
amend. XV, § 1, gender, U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1, or age if that age is eighteen or
over, U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
However, some interpret the Fourteenth
Amendment as granting the right to vote as a political right, not a civil right. See Steven
G. Calabresi, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Guarantee Equal Justice for All?, 34 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 152 (2011). See also Harper v. Virginia. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663, 665 (1966).
2 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). See generally Ariela R. Dubler,
Sexing Skinner: History and the Politics of the Right to Marry, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1348
(2010) (revisiting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) and Loving
under the question of current issues related to the right to marry).
3 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (applying the Second
Amendment to the States); District of Columbia v. Heller, 544 U.S. 570, 570 (2008)
(interpreting a right to possess handguns for personal self-defense).
4 16 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006); Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal
Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 513–14
(2010).
5 See, e.g., Michael D. de Leeuw et al., Ready, Aim, Fire? District of Columbia v.
Heller and Communities of Color, 25 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 133, 148–50 (2009).
6 See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Five Takes on McDonald v.
Chicago, 26 J.L. & POL. 273, 296–97 (2011) (pointing out the repeated denial of the Court
(even the plurality) to articulate a standard of review in either Heller or McDonald).
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unusual punishment.7 Persons in this population do not have the
same criminal culpability as others, and the death penalty should
not be applied.8 Given that the Court has prohibited the
execution of persons with intellectual disabilities because of this
lower culpability,9 perhaps that right to arms under the Second
Amendment should not apply equally to persons with intellectual
disabilities either.
Rather than debating over executions,
preventing some of the crimes that could lead to an execution
might be even better.
Congress may have tried to address this over forty years ago.
One of the major objectives of the Gun Control Act of 1968 (Gun
Control Act) was to deny specific populations access to firearms—
felons, minors, and “persons who had been adjudicated as mental
defectives or committed to mental institutions.”10 The goal was
to deny access to firearms to these “special risk groups” or, at the
very least, punish those who provided such access.11 The Gun
Control Act barred the knowing transfer of guns or ammunition
to the named groups.12 The Gun Control Act achieved this task
easily with some groups: determining who is a minor is as easy
as seeing proof of age, something most people have.13 Also, felony
convictions are recorded and tracked.14
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
Id. at 320–21.
The term “intellectual disability” is synonymous with “mental retardation.” FAQ
on Intellectual Disability, AAIDD (last visited Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.aaidd.org/
content_104.cfm. But intellectual disability is gaining currency as the preferred term. In
fact, the American Association on Mental Retardation changed its name in 2007 to the
American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities. Id. Based on the
preference for the former term, it will be used throughout this article, although the author
will recognize the use of “mental retardation” in quoted material. The AAIDD has noted:
It is crucial that “mental retardation” and “intellectual disability” should be
precisely synonymous in definition and in all related classification because
current federal and state laws contain the term “mental retardation.” That is
the term used in law and public policy to determine eligibility for state and
federal programs, including the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act—
IDEA (2004), Social Security Disability Insurance, and Medicaid Home and
Community Based Waiver. Also, the term “mental retardation” is used for
citizenship and legal status, civil and criminal justice, early care and
education, training and employment, income support, health care, and housing
and zoning.
Id.
10 Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4
J. LEGAL STUD. 133, 149 (1975).
11 Id. at 152.
12 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006).
13 However, as has been argued and seen in voter disenfranchisement situations,
many citizens do not have government-issued identification. See Julien Kern, As-Applied
Constitutional Challenges, Class Actions, and Other Strategies: Potential Solutions to
Challenging Voter Identification Laws After Crawford v. Marion County Election Board,
42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 629, 631–32 (2009). This calls into question issues of discrimination
regarding the lawful purchase of firearms for persons, especially rural persons without
7
8
9
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But the restriction regarding persons with intellectual
disabilities is too vague to measure, track, or enforce in the
manner surely intended.15 Further, the rights we have taken
away from minors and felons fall in line with other rights
similarly removed. Minors’ rights are restricted in a number of
ways: they cannot vote, marry, enter into contracts, etc.16 But a
person with intellectual disabilities often explicitly has all the
rights of a person without similar disabilities by way of bills of
rights that explicitly guarantee all rights will be recognized
unless a person is adjudicated incompetent.17

proof of age.
14 The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention (Brady Bill) Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159,
107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–22 (2006)) requires that
background checks are conducted prior to sales by licensed firearms dealers, and as a
method to complete those checks, Congress required the FBI to implement the National
Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), which tracks felony convictions,
within five years of the passage of the Brady Bill. See James B. Jacobs & Jennifer Jones,
Keeping Firearms Out of the Hands of the Dangerously Mentally Ill, 47 CRIM. L. BULL.
388, 393 (2011); see also National Instant Criminal Background Check System, FED.
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (last visited Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/cjis/nics. However, states did not necessarily submit the required data to the NICS,
which led to the passage of the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No.
110-180 § 2, 121 Stat. 2559 (2008).
15 See generally Jacobs & Jones, supra note 14.
16 See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 824 (1988):
There is . . . complete or near unanimity among all 50 States and the District of
Columbia in treating a person under sixteen as a minor for several important
purposes. In no State may a fifteen-year-old vote or serve on a jury. Further,
in all but one State a fifteen-year-old may not drive without parental consent,
and in all but four States a fifteen-year-old may not marry without parental
consent.
17 States have individualized bills of rights that explicitly state that rights may not
be denied unless a formal adjudication has occurred: “To articulate the existing legal and
human rights of persons with developmental disabilities so that they may be exercised
and protected. Persons with developmental disabilities shall have all the rights enjoyed
by citizens of the state and the United States.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 393.13(2)(d) (West
2011).
Because persons with mental retardation have been denied rights solely
because of their retardation, the general public should be educated to the fact
that persons with mental retardation who have not been adjudicated
incompetent and for whom a guardian has not been appointed by a due process
proceeding in a court have the same rights and responsibilities enjoyed by all
citizens of this state. All citizens are urged to assist persons with mental
retardation in acquiring and maintaining rights and in participating in
community life as fully as possible.
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 591.002(e) (West 2010). “Each person with mental
retardation in this state has the rights, benefits, and privileges guaranteed by the
constitution and laws of the United States and this state.” HEALTH & SAFETY § 592.011(a).
Further, the federal government has noted that rights are not reduced based on an
intellectual disability:
Congress finds that—(1) disability is a natural part of the human experience
that does not diminish the right of individuals with developmental disabilities
to live independently, to exert control and choice over their own lives, and to
fully participate in and contribute to their communities through full
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However, the effectiveness of the language that addresses
persons with intellectual disabilities is debatable. The Gun
Control Act, and subsequent amendments, left a wide gap in its
limitations on “mental defective,” ignoring not only the need to
use control measures to protect society, but also to protect special
risk groups, namely, those with intellectual disabilities. And
regardless of whether such persons are covered, indeed, their
coverage is inadequate. There is no database of persons with
intellectual disabilities,18 and the prohibition against owning a
firearm applies only to those so adjudicated by a court as mental
defectives and only when notice of the adjudication is provided to
a national database.19 If this hole cannot be filled, clearly,
denying rights of access is not enough. Therefore, to achieve the
goal of protecting society as well as persons with intellectual
disabilities, we must aim to prevent access to guns through an
alternative avenue: criminalize allowing a person with
intellectual disabilities access to a personally-owned firearm.

integration and inclusion in the economic, political, social, cultural, and
educational mainstream of United States society.
42 U.S.C. § 15001(a)(1) (2006). “The rights of individuals with developmental disabilities
described in findings made in this section shall be considered to be in addition to any
constitutional or other rights otherwise afforded to all individuals.” 42 U.S.C. § 15009(b).
18 This is not to suggest that a database of persons with intellectual disabilities is
recommended. Such a database could too easily lead to improper discrimination in areas
of housing, employment, and the like. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442, 450 (1985) (although refusing to find persons with
intellectual disabilities to belong to a quasi-suspect class, holding that equal protection
was violated for failure of any rational basis to justify requiring a special permit for
homes for persons with intellectual disabilities).
19 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) (2006). “Adjudicated as a mental defective” has been defined
as:
(a) A determination by a court, board, commission, or other lawful authority
that a person, as a result of marked subnormal intelligence, or mental illness,
incompetency, condition, or disease:
(1) Is a danger to himself or to others; or
(2) Lacks the mental capacity to contract or manage his own affairs.
(b) The term shall include—
(1) A finding of insanity by a court in a criminal case; and
(2) Those persons found incompetent to stand trial or found not guilty by
reason of lack of mental responsibility pursuant to articles 50a and 72b of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. 850a, 876b
27 C.F.R. 478.11(a) (2010). See also Allen Rostron, Incrementalism, Comprehensive
Rationality, and the Future of Gun Control, 67 MD. L. REV. 511, 551–52 (2008)
[hereinafter Rostron, Incrementalism].(addressing the lack of notice of mental illness
adjudication in Virginia which allowed Seung-Hui Cho to purchase firearms in spite of a
background check). In 2008, only four states regularly provided the information needed
to keep the database current, and less than half of the states provided any information
regarding mental health records. Id. at 552–53. Of particular concern, though, is what
qualifies as that court, “board, commission, or other lawful authority” as an entity that
could remove someone’s (now-understood) Constitutional right.
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This Article begins this discussion and supports adopting
such legislation for two distinct reasons. First, guns should not
be possessed by persons with significantly limited cognitive and
reasoning skills.20 Second, similar to child-access prevention
laws, legislation should hold accountable those persons who
improperly store their guns.
Part I provides background,
including legislative information as related to the Gun Control
Act and its implementation, focusing on its language and
applicable amendments regarding persons prohibited from
firearm possession. Part I also explains child-access prevention
laws, a newer area of gun control legislation. Part II reviews
judicial interpretation of legislative language related to persons
with intellectual disabilities under the Gun Control Act before
moving to a discussion of the Supreme Court’s holding in Atkins
v. Virginia, the case in which the Court held the execution of
persons with intellectual disabilities to be unconstitutional.21 By
comparing the justifications of Atkins and other Court language,
there exists an argument that child-access prevention laws
should be extended to cover persons with intellectual disabilities.
Thus, Part III proposes ways in which to fill the gap of the
population mentioned, but for all practical purposes
unaddressed, in gun control legislation by extending child-access
prevention laws to persons with intellectual disabilities.
I. RELEVANT GUN CONTROL LEGISLATION
A. Intellectually Disabled Under the Gun Control Act of 1968:
“Mental Defects”
In 1968, in the wake of assassinations of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. and Senator Robert Kennedy, Congress passed the Gun
Control Act.22 One of the primary purposes of the Gun Control
Act was to restrict firearms possession, prohibiting certain
special risk groups from possessing guns and prohibiting the

20 See generally Richard J. Bonnie, The American Psychiatric Association’s Resource
Document on Mental Retardation and Capital Sentencing: Implementing Atkins v.
Virginia, 28 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 11 (2004) (discussing the meaning of
“significant”).
21 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 304 (2002).
22 Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 921–928 and in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (2006)). This was the first
primary firearms legislation since the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801–5872,
passed in 1934, which had been prompted especially by concerns of gangsters and
organized crime. See Zimring, supra note 10, at 138 (“The National Firearms Act of 1934,
after the handgun registration provisions were deleted, was a concentrated attack on
civilian ownership of machine guns, sawed-off shotguns, silencers, and other relatively
rare firearms that had acquired reputations as gangster weapons during the years
preceding its passage.”).
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transfer of guns to such groups by licensed dealers.23 The Gun
Control Act addresses this in two provisions. The first provision
states: “It shall be unlawful for any person to sell or otherwise
dispose of any firearm or ammunition to any person knowing or
having reasonable cause to believe that such person . . . has been
adjudicated as a mental defective or has been committed to any
mental institution.”24 The second provision states:
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been adjudicated as a
mental defective or has been committed to any mental
institution . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce,
or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to
receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce.25

The only reference to persons with intellectual disabilities
could be found under the inclusion of persons “who have been
adjudicated as a mental defective.”26
Zimring, supra note 10, at 149.
18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) (2006). Other prohibitions include the ability to sell firearms
to one who has been convicted of a felony, dishonorably discharged from the Armed
Forces, or has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1), (6), (9). Congress couches its prohibitions under commerce restrictions;
however, the Supreme Court held that Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause authority
in enacting the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 549 (1995) (holding 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1) unconstitutional because it is a “criminal
statute that by its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic
enterprise, however broadly those terms are defined”).
25 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4). Although the Lopez Court held that the Gun-Free School
Zones Act was unconstitutional, some circuits have upheld subsequent constitutional
challenges to the Act because it contained a “jurisdictional” clause. See United States v.
Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038, 1045–46 (9th Cir. 2005). Interestingly, despite the Court finding
Congress does not generally have the power to regulate guns, the Court has been willing
to find that Congress has the authority to regulate drugs. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S.
1, 42 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (recognizing that Congress has the authority to
regulate controlled substances under the Commerce Clause).
26 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(d)(4), (g)(4). States use a variety of terms to discuss mental
impairment in gun legislation. The District of Columbia prohibits the sale of firearms to
persons whom the seller “has reasonable cause to believe is not of sound mind” or who is
under the age of twenty-one. D.C. CODE § 22-4507 (LexisNexis through 2011 legislation).
Alabama prohibits the delivery of a pistol to a person “of unsound mind.” ALA. CODE
§ 13A-11-76 (LexisNexis 2005). California bans firearm possession by (and transfer to)
persons adjudicated as “a danger to others as a result of a mental disorder or mental
illness, or who has been adjudicated to be a mentally disordered sex offender.” CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE § 8103(a)(1) (West 2010). Key in California is section 8103 of its Welfare
and Institutions Code. Under this section, persons who have “been placed under
conservatorship by a court . . . because the person is gravely disabled as a result of a
mental disorder or impairment by chronic alcoholism” may not possess a firearm. Id. at
§ 8103(e)(1). Further, section 8101 states that no one shall “knowingly supply, sell, give,
or allow possession or control of a firearm,” to anyone covered in section 8103, violation of
which is subject to a two-to-four-year prison sentence. Id. at § 8101(b). However,
California appellate courts have stated that a person who is “capable of surviving safely in
freedom with the help of willing and responsible family members, friends, or third
parties” is not gravely disabled and may still own a firearm. San Diego Cnty. Dep’t of Soc.
Serv. v. Neal (In re Conservatorship of Neal), 235 Cal. Rptr. 577, 578 (1987); Estate of
Davis v. Treharne (In re Conservatorship of Davis), 177 Cal. Rptr. 369, 373 (1981).
23
24
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The ban against transferring guns to the special risk
populations was not strengthened with any means of verification
for any group other than minors; a purchaser merely needed to
state he or she was eligible, and the dealer was able to rely on
her word.27
In 1993, after the shooting of President Ronald Reagan,
Congress responded with the Brady Bill,28 which attempted to
address the hole in the 1968 Gun Control Act by implementing a
waiting period before the purchase of a handgun and by
establishing a national background system check.29 This law was
implemented in two stages, giving states time to gather the
records and time to institute the computerized system to
maintain those records.30 But the Bill did not seem to account for
how it would motivate states to provide information related to
those who had been adjudicated “as a mental defective.”31 It
would be fifteen years before any attempt was successful in
trying to strengthen the meaning behind the Brady Bill
regarding this particular group, and even then, the group is
again only a tag-along.32
That improvement to the Brady Law came after the shooting
at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia
Tech),33 in which thirty-two people were murdered and twentyfour wounded by Seung-Hui Cho, who had purchased firearms in
spite of having been ordered to receive outpatient treatment for
Further, the Welfare and Institutions Code specifically states that “gravely disabled does
not include mentally retarded persons by reason of being mentally retarded alone.” CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 5008(h)(3) (West 2010).
27 Zimring, supra note 10, at 152–53.
28 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536
(1993) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–22). Scholars note that the piecemeal
approach to gun legislation should be replaced with a comprehensive reform. See, e.g.,
Rostron, Incrementalism, supra note 19, at 568.
29 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act § 103.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 In the interim, other gun control legislation passed, including the controversial
federal assault weapons ban, which subsequently expired in 2004. Public Safety and
Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act, Pub. L. No 103-322, 108 Stat. 1996 (1994)
(repealed 2004). Whether a renewed assault weapons ban would survive constitutional
scrutiny under Heller is debatable. It has been concluded that the type of arm possessed
can indeed be regulated, and if the arm is not in “common use at the time” among
Americans, the arm is not protected under the Second Amendment. District of Columbia
v. Heller, 554 U.S 570, 624–27 (2008); Allen Rostron, Protecting Gun Rights and
Improving Gun Control After District of Columbia v. Heller, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
383, 388 (2009) [hereinafter Rostron, Protecting].
33 See Investigation of April 16, 2007 Critical Incident At Virginia Tech, OFFICE OF
THE INSPECTOR GEN. FOR MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL RETARDATION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE
SERVICES 3, available at http://www.oig.virginia.gov/documents/VATechRpt-140.pdf. Gun
control legislation often follows shootings that gain national recognition. See, e.g.,
Rostron, Incrementalism, supra note 19, at 561–62.
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mental illness.34 After that shooting, Congress passed the NICS
Improvement Amendments Act.35 The Act was intended to
strengthen the Brady Bill’s background check system through
the National Instant Check System (NICS).36
As part of the desired improvement, Congress sought to
increase the availability of information that would result in
disqualification of gun ownership by automating the information
related to mental illness.37 That access could be automated, or at
least improved, if the information were computerized.38 The Act
required that federal agencies with information related to a
person falling under the categories of prohibited possessors39
report that information to the Attorney General at least
quarterly.40 The Attorney General is then charged with updating
the NICS.41 Further, states are to make similar information
available when a person is adjudicated as a mental defective.42
Federal funds may be withheld from states that fail to comply.43
States were to be provided grants to assist with the cost of
upgrading their information—creating electronic systems, and
collecting and analyzing data.44 Failure to comply results in loss
of funds as allocated under the Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968.45 The initial review period to determine compliance
would not begin until 2011; that review would extend for two
years.46
The deadline to comply with the NICS Improvement
Amendments Act has come and gone, and in spite of the threat of
losing federal funds, not all states are complying.47 In February
34
35

(2008).

See, e.g., Rostron, Incrementalism, supra note 19, at 550–51.
NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-180, 121 Stat. 2559

§ 2, 121 Stat. at 2559–60.
Id. See also Associated Press, Mental Health Records Not in Gun Database,
MSNBC.COM (Nov. 26, 2005), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10214838/ns/us_newscrime_and_courts/. Some complained that prohibiting gun possession by persons with
mental illness was unfair in that it denied their rights based on a medical condition.
Associated Press, supra. Although Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Heller
seemed to dismiss any question of constitutionality of this prohibition, it certainly has not
been analyzed as a distinct issue. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. The NRA, however,
supported the NICS Improvement Act; it also negotiated for a release from disabilities
provision, which was included. See Rostron, Incrementalism, supra note 19, at 555.
38 § 2, 121 Stat. at 2560.
39 This applies to persons listed under 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g) and (n). § 101, 121 Stat. at
2561.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 2566–67.
43 Id. at 2565.
44 Id. at 2567.
45 Id. at 2569.
46 Id.
47 Greg Bluestein, Most U.S. States Don’t Follow Mental Illness Gun Law,
36
37
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2011, a month after the compliance deadline passed, nine states
had provided no information,48 and seventeen other states had
sent fewer than twenty-five names.49 Surely, those states have
more than twenty-five persons who have been adjudicated as
mental defects.
In passing the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007,
Congress stated:
On April 16, 2007, a student with a history of mental illness at the
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University shot to death 32
students and faculty members, wounded an additional 26 individuals,
and then took his own life. The shooting, the deadliest campus
shooting in United States history, renewed the need to improve
information-sharing that would enable Federal and State law
enforcement agencies to conduct complete background checks on
potential firearms purchasers. In spite of a proven history of mental
illness, the shooter was able to purchase the two firearms used in the
shooting.
Improved coordination between State and Federal
authorities could have ensured that the shooter’s disqualifying mental
health information was available to NICS.50

Further, in discussing the findings and definitions, the focus
regarding the inadequate data was on “mental health” and
mental illnesses.51 Congress did not appear to focus on issues of
intellectual disabilities, which left an entire population of
persons often considered incompetent in other ways, able to
purchase and possess firearms.
Of course, regulations can cover only those who are required
to abide by them. Not covered by the Gun Control Act or the
NICS Improvement Amendment Act are private sales of firearms
to persons.52 While gun possession itself is prohibited for persons
adjudicated mentally defective, the transfer of the gun is not
prohibited so long as that transfer is done by a private individual
who is not engaged in the business of selling firearms.53 Some
have estimated that half of all gun sales involve used guns, and
thus are likely not covered by the required background checks.54
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 17, 2011, 02:04 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/17/
few-states-follow-mental-_n_824738.html.
48 Id. Problems with the distribution of promised funds and with privacy laws were
cited as roadblocks to the information being submitted by the states. Id.
49 Id.
50 NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-180, § 2(9), 121
Stat. at 2559, 2260 (2008).
51 Id. at 2560–61.
52 See Rostron, Incrementalism, supra note 19, at 556.
53 See id. Some states, such as California and Pennsylvania, have implemented the
background-check requirement for all transfers. Id.
54 See Philip J. Cook, Stephanie Molliconi & Thomas B. Cole, Regulating Gun
Markets, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 69–70 (1995) (finding data supportive of the
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B. Child-Access Prevention Laws55
The federal prohibition against providing firearms to minors
has been in place for over forty years, but child-access prevention
laws (CAP laws) are, by comparison, relatively recent. Although
possession by a minor and transfer to a minor is prohibited under
federal law and most state laws, CAP laws extend this one step
further by holding a private gun owner criminally liable when a
minor gains access to that person’s gun.56
Although not a part of federal law, at least twenty-seven
states and the District of Columbia have enacted CAP laws.57 A
handful of these states actually provide for criminal liability even
if the child who gains access does not cause injury.58 Some
statutes merely prevent providing a firearm to a minor, while
others impose criminal liability for negligently storing even
unloaded firearms such that a minor gains access to it.59

conclusions that approximately half of all gun sales involve used guns and that
approximately forty percent occur in secondary markets rather than in regulated
markets).
55 This Article accepts CAP laws as a beneficial part of gun policy.
For an
informative analysis of CAP laws, see Andrew J. McClurg, Child Access Prevention Laws:
A Commonsense Approach to Gun Control, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 47, 51–53, 58
(1999). For a listing and categorization of CAP laws, see generally Child Access
Prevention, LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE (Feb. 2008), http://www.lcav.org/
content/child_access_prevention.pdf.
56 Other statutes create civil liability for similar situations when the minor gains
access to a gun and injures herself or another. See Rostron, Protecting, supra note 32, at
385 (arguing that the decision in Heller will, contrary to popular thought, help push
toward “strong, sensible gun laws”).
57 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12035-12036 (West 2009); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.3 (West
2009); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-12-108.7 (West 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 2937(i) (West 2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571(g) (West 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53(a)A-217(a) (West 2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 603, 1456 (2007); D.C. CODE
§ 7-2507.02 (LexisNexis 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790-174 (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-11-101.1 (2011); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-10.5 (LexisNexis 2006); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 707-714.5 (LexisNexis 2007); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-9(a) (West 2010);
430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 65/4(c) (West 2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-10-7 (West 2004); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 724.22(7) (West 2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 527.110 (West 2006); MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-104 (LexisNexis 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 131L
(West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.666 (West 2009); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-37-14, 9737-15 (West 2011); MO. REV. STAT. § 571.060(1)-(2) (West 2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 41.472, 202.300 (LexisNexis 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 650-C:1 (LexisNexis 2007);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-15 (West 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-315.1 (LexisNexis 2009);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1273(B) (West 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-47-60.1 (2002);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-17-1319, 39-17-1320 (2010); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.13 (West
2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-509.6 (LexisNexis 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-56.2
(2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 948.55 (West 2005).
58 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-10.5 (LexisNexis 2006); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707714.5 (LexisNexis 2007); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-104 (LexisNexis 2002); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 131L (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.666 (West 2009);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-15 (West 2005); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.13 (West 2011).
59 See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-10.5 (LexisNexis 2006); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 707-714.5 (LexisNexis 2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 131L (West 2002).
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Gun control legislation tends to be reactive rather than
proactive. This is how many of the child-access prevention laws
have come about.60 However, the idea that a person with limited
intellectual functioning can access a firearm seems absurd to
most, but nothing works to actually prevent it. No database
exists. A gun dealer has no way to determine whether a person
has been adjudicated mentally defective. We could not expect a
dealer to refuse to sell a gun to a person merely because that
person was unable to complete an application form; after all,
nothing in the regulations prohibit illiterate persons from gun
possession.61 Gun shows have even less controlled measures for
selling firearms.62
Of course, given Congress’s already reactionary manner, the
likelihood of legislation being enacted before a problem is noticed
is quite low. This is why the incremental nature of gun policy
harms our full picture of the issues.63
Although states vary widely, review of specific statutory
language can be instructive as to the nature of CAP laws. Below,
the laws in California and the District of Columbia are examined.
i. California
In California:
a person commits the crime of “criminal storage of a firearm of the
first degree” if he or she keeps any loaded firearm within any
premises that are under his or her custody or control and he or she
knows or reasonably should know that a child is likely to gain access
to the firearm without the permission of the child’s parent or legal
guardian and the child obtains access to the firearm and thereby
causes death or great bodily injury to himself, herself, or any other
person.64

This becomes “criminal storage of a firearm of the second degree”
if the child causes injury other than serious bodily injury or
carries the firearm “either to a public place or in violation of
section 417 (drawing a weapon in a rude or threatening
manner).65
60 Although most have come about as a means to prevent accidental shootings by
children, CAP laws can also be useful in reducing intentional shootings. See McClurg et
al., supra note 55, at 53 (“CAP laws are a reasonable and feasible way to reduce all
variety of gun tragedies that result from guns getting into the hands of unauthorized
users.”).
61 This would also work a great discrimination against those uneducated or
undereducated.
62 One of the primary areas of legislative debate involves the gun show loophole.
63 See, e.g., Rostron, Incrementalism, supra note 19, at 552–53.
64 CAL. PENAL CODE § 12035(b)(1) (West 2009).
65 § 12035(b)(2); CAL. PENAL CODE § 417 (West 2010).
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Criminal liability, though, extends only so far. It is not a
crime if the child “obtains the firearm as a result of an illegal
entry to any premises by any person,” or if the firearm was kept
locked such that a reasonable person believed it to be secure, the
firearm was carried on the person or was locked with a locking
device, or if the person has no reason to believe a child would be
present on the premises.66 Further, it is not a violation if the
person whose firearm is accessed was performing her duties as a
peace officer of the armed forces or National Guard, or if the child
obtains the firearm and uses it “in a lawful act of self-defense or
defense of another person . . . .”67
California extends the liability further if the child removes
the gun from the owner’s premises. If the child who gains access
to the firearm carries it off the premises from where it was
obtained, a separate crime occurs leading to up to one year in jail
and/or a fine up to $1000.68 If the child carries the firearm to a
school or school activity, that fine increases to up to $5000.69
Factors that are considered in arrest and punishment include: if
the child is injured, if the firearm obtained belonged to the child’s
parent, and if the person in possession of the firearm had taken a
firearms safety training course.70
ii. District of Columbia
Having had part of its gun control legislation at the center of
District of Columbia v. Heller, the District of Columbia revised its
laws and enacted the Firearms Registration Amendment Act of
2008.71 Included in the District’s current firearms law is the
imposition of criminal liability if a minor gains access to one’s
firearm.
No person shall store or keep any firearm on any premises under his
control if he knows or reasonably should know that a minor is likely to
gain access to the firearm without the permission of the parent or

§ 12035(c).
§ 12035(c).
§ 12035(b).
§ 12036(c).
§ 12036(f)–(h).
Firearms Registration Amendment Act of 2008, 17-372, 56 D.C. Reg. 1365 (Jan.
28, 2008); see Rostron, Protecting, supra note 32, at 398–99 (discussing the District of
Columbia’s response to Heller). Among the changes, the District of Columbia extended
the waiting period, allowed registration of even semi-automatic pistols (previously
prohibited), and banned extremely high-powered rifles. Id.; see D.C. CODE § 7-2502.01
(LexisNexis 2008). In the year after Heller, the District first passed emergency legislation
(the Firearms Registration Emergency Amendment Act), with the laws becoming
permanent by that December. See Firearm Registration in the District of Columbia,
METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT (last visited Sept. 18, 2011), http://mpdc.dc.gov/
mpdc/cwp/view,a,1237,q,547431,mpdcNav_GID,1523,mpdcNav,%7C.asp.
66
67
68
69
70
71
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guardian of the minor unless such person: (1) Keeps the firearm in a
securely locked box, secured container, or in a location which a
reasonable person would believe to be secure; or (2) Carries the
firearm on his person or within such close proximity that he can
readily retrieve and use it as if he carried it on his person.72

Violation of this law results in criminal liability including a
fine up to $1000 and/or 180 days in jail.73 The punishment
increases to $5000 and/or five years of imprisonment if injury or
death is caused by the minor.74 However, liability is not found if
the minor gains access by “unlawful entry or burglary to any
premises by any person.”75
II. SINGLING OUT THE INTELLECTUALLY DISABLED
One of the hallmarks of legislation advocating for the rights
of persons with intellectual disabilities is how they deserve the
same rights and the same treatment as persons without
intellectual disabilities. Groups advocate for bills of rights in
which it is declared, and often codified as law, that persons with
intellectual disabilities have all the same rights guaranteed to
others under the Constitution.76 Organizations promote policies
assuring such equal treatment. For example, The Arc “promotes
and protects the human rights of people with intellectual and
developmental disabilities and actively supports their full
inclusion and participation in the community throughout their
lifetimes,”77 and the American Association on Intellectual and
Developmental Disabilities “promotes progressive policies, sound
research, effective practices, and universal human rights for
people with intellectual and developmental disabilities.”78 In
spite of all of the effort to achieve equality, the law has not
treated persons with intellectual disabilities the same as persons
without such limitations. Nor should it—at least not when it
comes to their protection involving firearms.
First, in the Gun Control Act, persons with intellectual
disabilities seem to be a part of a list of identified “special risk
groups” whose rights are limited. Second, the Supreme Court

72 D.C. CODE § 7-2507.02(b). This second section, though, is arguably without bite as
this could allow a person to keep a loaded weapon within reach but also not on one’s
person.
73 § 7-2507.02(c)(1).
74 § 7-2507.02(c)(2).
75 § 7-2507.02(c)(3).
76 See supra text accompanying note 17.
77 Mission
& Core Values, THE ARC (last visited Sept. 20, 2011),
http://www.thearc.org/page.aspx?pid=2345.
78 Mission,
AAIDD (last visited Feb. 21, 2011), http://www.aaidd.org/
content_443.cfm?navID=129.
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has also, in reversing itself, determined that persons with
intellectual disabilities are not as culpable as persons without
similar disabilities.
A. Understanding “Mental Defective” Under the Gun
Control Act
When the Gun Control Act was passed, debate took place
regarding who should be, as a matter of law, prohibited from
possessing firearms.
In discussing the prohibition that
eventually resulted in the adopted language, “adjudicated as a
mental defective or has been committed to any mental
institution,” senators most often used “mentally incompetent”79
to describe such persons, intermittently using “psychotics,”80
“psychopaths,”81 “mentally deficient,”82 “mentally or emotionally
disturbed persons,”83 and “deranged persons.”84 Despite this
wide variety of terms used in the process of passing the Act, no
actual definition of “mental defective” appears in the Act.
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to comment on the
language of the Gun Control Act in Huddleston v. United
States.85
In dicta, the Court considered the aims of the
legislation prohibiting possession by specified groups. The goal
involved “keeping ‘these lethal weapons out of the hands of
criminals, drug addicts, mentally disordered persons, juveniles,
and other persons whose possession of them is too high a price in
danger to us all to allow.’”86 Thus, if we look too closely at
legislative history solely as related to the phrase “adjudicated
mentally defective,” it could be determined that persons deficient
in learning and rationalization are not included. On the other
hand, the Court also noted that the goal was to keep firearms
from persons where it “would be contrary to public interest.”87
The Court later noted that the Act was intended, in addition to

79 See Anthony P. Dunbar, Torts—Liability of a Gun Dealer for Selling to a “Mental
Incompetent,” 58 TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1276 (1984) (citing congressional remarks in
revealing the history of the Gun Control Act’s adopted language including 114 CONG. REC.
26,718 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Dodd)); Id. at 27,406 (letter submitted by Sen. Ervin); Id.
at 25,786 (statement submitted by Sen. Mansfield & Sen. Tydings); Id. at 26,826, 27,409,
27,416 (remarks of Sen. Tydings); Id. at 23,070 (remarks of Rep. Corman).
80 114 CONG. REC. 23,070 (1968) (remarks of Rep. Anderson).
81 Id. at 23,072 (remarks of Rep. Horton).
82 Id. at 27,404 (remarks of Sen. Percy).
83 Id. at 27,420 (remarks of Sen. Cannon).
84 Id. (remarks of Sen. Byrd).
85 Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 825 (1974).
86 Id. (commenting about who Congress wanted to keep firearms from (quoting 114
CONG. REC. 13,219 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Tidings)).
87 Huddleston, 415 U.S. at 824.
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affect sales, to “keep firearms away from the persons Congress
classified as potentially irresponsible and dangerous.”88
Circuit Courts have also addressed the language in the Gun
Control Act. In defining “adjudicated as mental defective or who
has been committed to a mental institution,” the Eighth Circuit
concluded that “mental defective” differed from mental illness.89
The court referred to the testimony of the doctor from the case
who said he understood “mental defective” to be “synonymous
with mental retardation.”90 Further, as the court noted, “[i]n
law, a distinction has usually been made between those persons
who are mentally defective or deficient on the one hand, and
those who are mentally diseased or ill on the other.”91 The
conclusion focused on subnormal intelligence as the target of
legislation prohibiting those adjudicated as mentally defective
from possessing firearms.92 And although the court pointed to at
least one other decision that interpreted “mental defective”
differently, the court asserted it was giving the phrase its general
meaning.93 Finally, the court distinguished a person with
intellectual disabilities from a person with mental illness by
stating: “A mental defective, therefore, as has often been said, is
a person who has never possessed a normal degree of intellectual
capacity, whereas in an insane person faculties which were
originally normal have been impaired by mental disease.”94
88 Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 212, 218 (1976) (addressing the conviction
of a person who possessed a firearm in violation on the Gun Control Act due to his status
as a convicted felon and concluding that the Act applied to the behavior in question, the
intrastate receipt of a firearm that had previously been transported in interstate
commerce).
89 United States v. Hansel, 474 F.2d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir. 1973). In Hansel, the
defendant had been admitted to a hospital “for a brief period of observation.” Id. at 1122.
Because this hospitalization was not in accord with civil commitment statutes in
Nebraska, the State conceded that the defendant had not been “committed.” Id. Thus, the
case turned on whether it could be held that the defendant had been “adjudicated”
mentally defective. The Mental Health Board found that the defendant was mentally ill.
Id. at 1123. However, even if that could be an “adjudication,” the Eighth Circuit held it
was not the same as being adjudicated as mental defective. Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 1124.
92 Id. at 1124–25.
93 Id. at 1125.
94 Id. at 1124. The court concluded that Congress had not intended to prohibit
possession from all persons who had any history of mental illness. Id. at 1125. This is in
stark contrast to what is often understood about the Gun Control Act. The Eighth Circuit
thus concluded that, for a person with a mental illness to be prohibited from possessing a
firearm, that person must have been committed to a mental institution. Accord United
States v. Giardina, 861 F.2d 1334, 1337 (5th Cir. 1988) (following Hansel); cf. United
States v. Vertz, 40 F. App’x 69, 74 (6th Cir. 2002) (refusing to rely on Michigan
commitment requirements in determining whether the defendant had been “committed”
such as would preclude legal firearm possession: “[t]o give preclusive effect to each state’s
individual definition of terms in the firearms statute would be to frustrate one of the main
purposes of the law, which is to provide for national uniformity in the application of
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Disagreeing with the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of
“mental defective,” one district court specifically concluded that
the definition provided by Federal Firearms Regulations showed
that the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation was incorrect:
Adjudicated as a mental defective.
(a) A determination by a court, board, commission, or other lawful
authority that a person, as a result of marked subnormal intelligence,
or mental illness, incompetency, condition, or disease:
(1) Is a danger to himself or to others; or
(2) Lacks the mental capacity to contract or manage his own
affairs.95

The use of “as a result of marked subnormal intelligence” is
instructive, but not determinative; how far below normal is
unspecified.96 Regardless, the Code of Federal Regulations seems
to clarify that the term addresses both intellectual disabilities
(subnormal intelligence) and mental illness.
On the other hand, in interpreting the same phrase, but as
used in another statute, the Second Circuit excluded those with
subnormal intelligence as being covered by the language: “The
term ‘mentally defective,’ as used in the statute, is a concept
embracing more than intellectual capacity or the lack thereof.
The statute in subsection (a) specifically provides for the
exclusion of those lacking in intellectual capacity.”97
Although one may argue that the specific reference to
persons with subnormal intelligence in one section of the statute
and the addition of those with a mental defect in a subsequent
section indicates that the two mean different things, the Gun
firearms restrictions”). The Sixth Circuit further distinguished the term “mental defect”
as a condition requiring formal adjudication, whereas commitment to a mental
institution, by contrast due to the language used in the statute, did not require a court’s
involvement. Id. at 75.
95 United States v. Vertz, 102 F. Supp. 2d 787, 788 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (quoting 27
C.F.R. § 178.11 (2010) (current version at 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2010)).
96 For a person to receive a diagnosis of intellectual disability, there must be a
“significant limitation” in intellectual functioning. Definition of Intellectual Disability,
AAIDD (last visited Sept. 20, 2011), http://www.aaidd.org/content_100.cfm (“Intellectual
disability is a disability characterized by significant limitations both in intellectual
functioning and in adaptive behavior, which covers many everyday social and practical
skills. This disability originates before the age of 18.”). Although not required, an IQ test
may be used, and that score must typically measure below seventy—more than two
standard deviations below the median—for such a diagnosis. See, e.g., id. This provides
some sort of objective data regarding how far below normal qualifies as an intellectual
disability and means that only people who fall statistically and significantly below the
“normal” scale, and not merely those with below average intelligence, are considered
disabled.
97 United States v. Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d 405, 409–11 (2d Cir. 1956)
(interpreting a statute prohibiting the immigration of “idiots, imbeciles, feebleminded
persons [and those certified as mentally defective]”).
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Control Act did not list both. This is unclear, but it would appear
the Eight Circuit’s interpretation—at least that “mental defect”
does cover those with subnormal intelligence—is correct.
B. Reducing Criminal Culpability: From Penry to Atkins
i. Penry v. Lynaugh: Crafting a National Consensus
In 2002, responding to dissenters in precedent and to the
changing national consensus regarding death penalty issues, the
Supreme Court held that executions of persons with
developmental disabilities constitute “cruel and unusual
punishment” in violation of the Eighth Amendment.98 In so
doing, the Court reversed its 1989 precedent from Penry v.
Lynaugh, which had been based in great part on the Court’s
analysis of the history of the Eighth Amendment, the thenpresent death penalty national consensus (or lack thereof), and
historical common law treatment of “lunatics” and “idiots.”99
Understanding the Court’s treatment of this history sheds great
light on the wording—and almost certain interpretation of that
wording—of the Gun Control Act of 1968.100
Johnny Paul Penry was convicted of the 1979 rape and
murder of Pamela Carpenter, a crime committed when Penry
was twenty-two.101 Penry had been diagnosed as a child with
organic brain syndrome, his IQ having been measured between
50 and 63—a number falling in the mild range for developmental
disabilities.102 His mental ability was limited, compared to that
of a six and one-half year-old child.103 After his conviction and
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 304, 321 (2002).
See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331–40 (1989). The conviction, however, was
reversed on other grounds, granting Penry a new trial. Id. Penry was again convicted in
the subsequent trial, and the Supreme Court again reversed the verdict. Penry v.
Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 804 (2001). The second reversal resulted in a third trial for
sentencing issues, in which Penry was once again sentenced to death. Penry v. State, 178
S.W.3d 782, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed
that sentence and ordered a new punishment trial. Penry, 178 S.W.3d at 789. Penry’s
sentencing issues ended, however, with a plea deal in 2008 in which he agreed to three
life sentences, with no parole, and in which he was required to stipulate that he was not
mentally retarded. Mike Tolson, Deal Keeps Penry Imprisoned for Life, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, Feb. 16, 2008, at B1, available at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/front/
5546646.html. Guilt was never a factor as Penry had signed a confession. Id. at B1. The
Supreme Court’s decisions left untouched, though, the issue of the risk of false confessions
by persons with developmental disabilities. See, e.g., Meghan J. Ryan, Judging Cruelty,
44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 81, 143–45 (2010).
100 See supra Part I (discussion of “mental defect” in the Gun Control Act).
101 Penry, 492 U.S. at 307–10.
102 Id. at 307–08.
103 Id. at 308. Disturbingly, after Penry’s death sentence was reversed a third time,
prosecutors accepted three life sentences for him in lieu of seeking the death penalty a
fourth time. Tolson, supra note 99, at B1. The State had likely spent millions of dollars
on Penry’s appeals. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment: The Case
98
99
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sentence to death, Penry’s appeal was eventually heard by the
Supreme Court, where he argued that executing a person with
the reasoning capacity of a seven-year-old, a person with
developmental disabilities, would be cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.104
In holding against Penry, the Court first considered the
Eighth Amendment.
The Court noted that punishment
considered cruel and unusual at the time of the Eighth
Amendment’s drafting would also be prohibited in modern
times.105
The Court recognized, however, that “evolving
standards of decency” must also be considered in determining if
newer punishments might too be prohibited.106
Turning first, then, to eighteenth century common law, the
Court accepted that “idiots” and “lunatics” were not subject to
punishment.107 Idiocy, “understood as ‘a defect of understanding
from the moment of birth,’” was distinguished from lunacy, “a
partial derangement of the intellectual faculties, the senses
returning at uncertain intervals.”108 But the Court also indicated
the general common law understanding for an “idiot” was one
who had “a total lack of reason or understanding.”109 And from
this, the Court, focusing on the “permanent, congenital mental
deficiency,” found a similarity for previous treatment of “idiocy”
and the modern definition of developmental disabilities.110 But
the Court then narrowed the application of the prohibition on
punishing idiots to those persons who lacked the “capacity to
form criminal intent or to understand the difference between
good and evil,” drawing comparisons to the modern
understanding of one diagnosed as having severe or profound
mental retardation.111
The Court, however, sidestepped
for Eliminating Counties’ Role in the Death Penalty, 63 VAND. L. REV. 307, 310 n.14
(2010). As part of Penry’s deal, though, the State required Penry to state he did not have
intellectual disabilities. Tolson, supra note 99, at B1. And although it would appear the
prosecutors never believed Penry when he, his doctors, and his lawyers said he had
intellectual disabilities—a claim supported by medical evidence, IQ tests, and by
anecdotal evidence such as Penry’s taking a year of daily instruction, as an adult, to learn
to write his name. Brief of Petitioner at 6, Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (No. 876177). They and others took Penry’s word when he said he was not mentally retarded—a
statement made in a deal to avoid yet another death sentence. Tolson, supra note 99, at
B1 (quoting the victim’s niece: “[Penry] admitted he is not retarded. Now we know that
he was lying. He’s committed the biggest fraud ever on the criminal justice system”).
104 Penry, 492 U.S. at 328.
105 Id. at 330.
106 Id. at 330–31 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
107 Id. at 331.
108 Id. (quoting W. HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 1–2 n.2 (7th ed. 1795).
109 Id. at 331–32.
110 Id. at 332.
111 Id. at 333. The person with a diagnosis of severe mental retardation has an IQ
measured between 20–25 and 35–40. Id. at 308 n.1 (citing AM. ASS’N ON MENTAL
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addressing whether punishing such persons would today be
violative of the Eighth Amendment, relying instead on an
assumption that such persons would find protections under an
insanity defense.112
Addressing the case before it, the Court rationalized that
because Penry had been found competent to stand trial, and
because the jury rejected his insanity defense, Penry was deemed
to have known that what he had done was wrong and thus could
have conformed his conduct to the legal requirements.113 In
doing so, the Court essentially ignored the fact that Penry’s IQ
was measured under sixty-three, that he never finished the first
grade, and that he had “the ability to learn and the learning or
the knowledge of the average six and one-half year-old kid.”114
In urging the Court to so hold, the State noted that
intellectual disabilities fell under the phrase “mental defect” as
used in insanity defenses.115 Because insanity defenses relied on
functional and not clinical components, the State argued, so too
should the application of the death penalty.116
In spite of having noted that at common law at the time of
the drafting of the Eighth Amendment it would have been
considered cruel and unusual to punish a “lunatic” or “idiot,” the
Court pushed aside that analysis in favor of maintaining the notprohibited (as opposed to actually accepted and implemented)
practice among states, that is, that other states had not outright
prohibited the practice of executing persons with intellectual
disabilities.117 The Court used this to conclude there was not a
DEFICIENCY, CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 1, 13 (H. Grossman ed., 1983)).
One with a diagnosis of profound mental retardation has an IQ measured below 20 or 25.
Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. But incompetence and intellectual disabilities are not the same. In addressing
the differences regarding the application of the death penalty and criminal trials, one
legal scholar said, “[y]ou can’t stand trial if you are unable to understand the death
penalty but there is a vast chasm between incompetence and mental retardation. . . . If
you are mentally retarded you are not protected.” Maria F. Durand, Texas Executes Two
Inmates,
ABCNEWS.COM
(Aug.
10,
2000),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/
story?id=96212&page=1 (quoting University of Texas at Austin law professor Jordan
Steiker).
114 Penry, 492 U.S. at 307–08 (quoting Dr. Jerome Brown, a clinical psychologist who
testified at Penry’s competency hearing).
115 Respondent’s Brief at 47, Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (No. 87-6177). In
the same brief, though, the State analogized intellectual disabilities to “mental disorder,”
showing further confusion of the two terms. Id. at 48. As later pointed out by Penry,
though, the two are not the same. Reply Brief of Petitioner at 7, Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302 (1989) (No. 87-6177) (“There are reasonably precise tests that measure the
degree of retardation and in addition mental retardation will be apparent from an early
age or else can be traced to an accident that damaged the brain.”).
116 Respondent’s Brief, supra note 115, at 47.
117 Penry, 492 U.S. at 330–31.
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national consensus against the practice.118 The Court did not,
however, indicate that the practice was actually used—that any
states regularly pursued the death penalty when faced with a
capital crime committed by a person with an intellectual
disability.
The Court heavily relied on a national consensus when it
addressed such support for its decision in Ford v. Wainwright, in
which it held that executing the insane violated the Eighth
Amendment.119 The Court in Penry clearly accepted that the
prohibition against punishing the mentally insane was
established at common law, therefore, it seems redundant to
have had to rely on a national consensus in agreeing with that
practice, but it did. Even with the historical analysis against
executing the insane, the Penry Court justified its holding in
Wainwright based on a national consensus.120 And in considering
execution of persons with intellectual disabilities, the Court
recognized that only the federal government and two states had
enacted legislation prohibiting the execution of persons with
intellectual disabilities.121 The Court then concluded that the
two states prohibiting these executions, even when considered
with the fourteen states that rejected any application of the
death penalty, did not support the finding of a national
consensus.122
Finally, the Court also analyzed whether punishing a
particular class of offenders, here, persons with intellectual
disabilities, contributed to the goals of punishment, namely,
retribution and deterrence, when considering the death
Id. at 331–34.
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408 (1986). The Court used the term “insane”
in deciding Ford, yet the case makes clear that the issue was mental illness as Ford had a
condition similar to paranoid schizophrenia. Id. at 402–03.
120 Penry, 492 U.S. at 334 (citing Wainwright, 477 U.S. at 408, which held that
execution of the insane violated the Eighth Amendment). The Court also relied on a
national consensus in Thompson v. Oklahoma, in which it considered a minimum age for
consideration of the death penalty. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 826–29 (1988).
121 Penry, 492 U.S. at 334 (These two states were Georgia and Maryland). Chief
Justice Rehnquist, however, dissenting in Atkins, pointed out that some studies have
estimated that as many as ten percent of death row inmates have an intellectual
disability. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 325, n.* (2002) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(citing R. Bonner & S. Rimer, Executing the Mentally Retarded Even as Laws Begin to
Shift, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2000, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/08/07/
us/executing-the-mentally-retarded-even-as-laws-begin-to-shift.html).
However, also
pointed out was the fact that “[m]ost people charged with capital murder are poor, and so
are represented by appointed lawyers. Many of these lawyers are inexperienced, even
incompetent, and often fail during the mitigation phase of the trial to present the
evidence of mental retardation that could persuade the jury to spare their client’s life.” Id.
Further, the problem is exacerbated by defendants who are ashamed to admit to being
disabled. Bonner & Rimer, supra note 121, at A1.
122 Penry, 492 U.S. at 335.
118
119
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penalty.123 For retribution to be meaningful, the sentence needs
to be related to the culpability of the offender.124 The Court
considered Penry’s argument that because his reasoning capacity
was like that of a seven-year-old (due to his intellectual
disability), executing him would be cruel and unusual in the
same way the Court had held that executing a juvenile was cruel
and unusual.125 Supporting Penry’s arguments, the AAIDD126
argued as amici that executing persons with intellectual
disabilities would not serve the retributive purposes of
punishment; their moral culpability was not the same as
others’.127
Again, the Court focused narrowly only on those with the
most severe disabilities, agreeing their moral culpability was
less.128 Additionally, the Court highlighted language in some
states’ statutes: “mental defect.”129 The Court noted that the
states that explicitly used that term did so as part of identified
mitigating circumstances that could be used by a fact-finder in
deciding whether the defendant’s capacity to “appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law was substantially impaired.”130 But the
Court maintained that the issue of intellectual disabilities should
be only that: mitigating evidence.131 The Court refused to hold
that all persons with intellectual disabilities should be similarly
treated.132
With the vast range of persons who are classified as having
an intellectual disability, the Court seemed uncomfortable with a
blanket prohibition on executing people based on which side of
seventy their IQ fell.133 Even on looking at “mental age,” with an
argument by Penry that his was effectively seven years or
younger, the Court declined to rely on that due to several noted
123 Id. at 335–36. Unless the punishment of imposing death contributes to one of the
two identified purposes of the death penalty, retribution and deterrence, then that
punishment is “nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and
suffering”—an unconstitutional punishment. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798
(1982).
124 Penry, 492 U.S. at 336.
125 Id. (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (plurality opinion)).
126 The American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) changed its name to
the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD) in
2007. FAQ on Intellectual Disability, supra note 9.
127 Penry, 492 U.S. at 336–37.
128 Id. at 337.
129 Id.
130 Id. (citing several state statutes including Alabama, New Hampshire, and
Wyoming).
131 Id. at 337–38.
132 Id. at 338–39.
133 Id.
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problems.134 Using the AAIDD amicus brief as support, the
Court pointed out that the “equivalence between nonretarded
children and retarded adults is, of course, imprecise.”135 The
Court appeared concerned that limiting executions strictly based
on the classification of having an intellectual disability could be
extended to limit such persons’ other rights, such as the right to
marry and the right to contract.136 The Court concluded that
because of those considerations, reiterating the lack of a national
consensus, it would not hold that executing persons with
intellectual disabilities was, per se, a violation of the Eighth
Amendment.137
The Court punted on the issue of national consensus. There
was no consensus favoring the execution of persons with
intellectual disabilities, there was merely not one with specific
prohibitions. Even if a disproportionate number of persons
sentenced to death have an intellectual disability, this is no
indication that the issue was presented in each case.138 But the
Court proceeded to craft one due to this lack of widespread
prohibitions. It seemed, though, that the real issue was the
Court’s desire to avoid a bright line: the persons that would be
protected under such a prohibition. In this case, a hard decision
led to a bad decision. At least it was not in place for long.
ii. Atkins v. Virginia: Evolving Standards in the Wake of
Penry
Thirteen years after Penry, the Court changed direction. In
2002, revisiting the issue of executing persons with intellectual
disabilities, the Court concluded that applying the death penalty
to such persons was excessive and in violation of the
Constitution, citing “evolving standards of decency” as reflected
by the debate and review engaged in by the American public,
legislators, scholars, and judges since Penry.139
A jury convicted Daryl Renard Atkins for a 1996 armed
robbery and capital murder of Eric Nesbitt.140 Atkins and

Id. at 339.
Id. (quoting Brief of AAMR et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 14
n.6, Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (No. 87-6177)).
136 Id. at 340. Of course, the Court seemed to review most of this information
through a frame of considering exculpating criminal responsibility—something Penry
never requested.
137 Id.
138 See supra text accompanying note 121. A deeper analysis of this issue would be
instructive, especially one that categorized the manner in which the crimes had been
committed.
139 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307, 321 (2002).
140 Id. at 307.
134
135
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William Jones, armed with a semiautomatic handgun, abducted
Nesbitt, drove him to an automatic teller machine, and took him
to an isolated location.141 Nesbitt was shot eight times.142
Confronted with a video recording of Atkins and Jones at the
ATM with Nesbitt, both testified.143 Their stories differed,
however, regarding who did the shooting.144 Jones’ story, though,
was more coherent and credible, and the State allowed Jones to
plead guilty to first-degree murder and to become ineligible for
the death penalty.145 Jones’ testimony appeared to be crucial in
the jury’s determination of the guilt of Atkins and its sentence of
death.146
In determining the sentence, the jury heard conflicting
testimony regarding Atkins’ mental capacity. Originally, a
forensic psychologist testified that Atkins was mildly mentally
retarded based on interviews with persons who knew Atkins,
reviews of school and court records, and the administration of an
intelligence test in which Atkins’ IQ was measured at 59.147
During a second sentencing phase,148 the same forensic
psychologist testified similarly, but the State this time presented
a rebuttal witness who said that Atkins was of “average
intelligence, at least” and suffered from antisocial personality
disorder.149 The State’s witness concluded that Atkins’ “by and
large terrible” academic performance was due to Atkins’
choices.150
Facing the death penalty, Atkins appealed and argued that
he could not be sentenced to death because of his intellectual
disability.151 The Virginia Supreme Court disagreed, but two
justices dissented and stated that the State’s witness’s “opinion
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 307 n.1.
Id. Additionally, Jones refused to provide an initial statement on arrest. Atkins,
however, failed to refuse; the inconsistencies between his initial and subsequent
statements further hurt his credibility. Id. at 307 n.2. As one defense attorney has stated,
“[t]he smart guy who doesn’t confess, who knows better than to give evidence against
himself, gets the deal. . . . But the guy who is retarded, who doesn’t understand all the
words of his Miranda warning, he gets death.” Bonner & Rimer, supra note 121, at A1
(quoting Jeffrey Pokorak, defense counsel for Oliver Cruz, sentenced to death and
executed in Texas in spite of an IQ of 64 or 76). See generally Eugene R. Milhizer,
Confessions after Connelly: An Evidentiary Solution for Excluding Unreliable Confessions,
81 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (2008).
147 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308–09.
148 The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the first sentence of death due to a
misleading verdict form. Id. at 309.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 310 n.6.
151 Id. at 310.
141
142
143
144
145
146
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that Atkins possesses average intelligence [was] ‘incredulous as a
matter of law,’ and concluded that ‘the imposition of the sentence
of death upon a criminal defendant who has the mental age of a
child between the ages of 9 and 12 [was] excessive.’”152 The
United States Supreme Court agreed to revisit the issue.153
Since the Court’s decision in Penry, legislatures across the
country had been spurred to take action. Recognizing this, the
Court highlighted seventeen states that had enacted legislation
exempting persons with intellectual disabilities from application
of the death penalty.154 It was not simply about how many states
had done so, though. The Court pointed out that more notable
was the move toward laws that protected persons who were
guilty of violent crime, something that was by no means
popular.155
Further, no states had moved to allow such
executions.156 The Court concluded that this was evidence that
society did not see criminals with intellectual disabilities as
having the same level of culpability as possessed by other
criminals.157 Thus, a national consensus had developed.158
The matter that made this issue difficult though, still
existed.159 The Court had to decide to whom the prohibition
would apply. Unable to hide behind a contrived lack of national
consensus, the Court had to take a stand. And making the
situation even more challenging, the parties in Atkins actually
disagreed whether Atkins had intellectual disabilities.160 The
Court dipped back into its purpose of punishment reasoning for
assistance.
The Court highlighted some definitional requirements to
determine whether a person has intellectual disabilities,

152 Id. (quoting Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312, 323–24 (Va. 2000) (Hassell,
J., dissenting)).
153 Id.
154 Id. at 314–15.
155 Id. at 315.
156 Id. at 315–16.
157 Id. at 316.
158 Id. Or more likely, a national consensus had been made known. After all, even
the Court acknowledged that the change across the country was likely prompted by the
Court’s ruling in Penry. In other words, the states that enacted the prohibitive legislation
likely already adhered to the practice of not executing persons with intellectual
disabilities, but after Penry those states recognized the need to enact formal legislation.
The Court further pointed to other evidence of a consensus, highlighting positions taken
by religious communities and the AAIDD opposing the use of the death penalty for
offenders with intellectual disabilities. Id. at 316 n.21. However, this was not new; it just
had not been affirmatively stated by all such organizations before.
159 See id. at 340 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the easily discernable cases of
those who are severely or profoundly mentally retarded and contrasting them to cases
involving mild cases).
160 Id. at 317.
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including “subaverage intellectual functioning” and “significant
limitations in adaptive skills.”161 However, persons in this
population also likely possess deficiencies in communication,
learning, reasoning, and impulse control.162 These deficiencies,
while not enough to eliminate responsibility for criminal acts, do
reduce the personal culpability involved.163 With a reduced
culpability, the retributive purposes of the death penalty are not
served.164
Further, deterrent purposes are not served because persons
with intellectual disabilities, being less likely to control impulses
and to learn from experience, are less likely to think through the
potential consequences and less likely to premeditate an action—
the very sort of thing targeted with deterrent-objective
punishments.165 For deterrence to have an effect as a reason for
punishment, the person being deterred must be able to
appreciate the weight of the decision to commit the crime and be
able to choose to proceed or not with the conduct based on the
risk of the punishment.
The Court’s decision was not unanimous. Both Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, joined by each other and Justice
Thomas, wrote separately. Both dissenting opinions primarily
focused on a complaint that the majority’s holding that executing
persons is unconstitutional as a violation of the Eighth
Amendment was based too much on a determination that
eighteen additional states represented a “national consensus”
and on review of foreign law and the views of professional or
religious organizations.166
Justice Rehnquist asserted that
setting a national standard based on such was an improper
application of federalism.167 Instead, he argued, to analyze
whether punishment violates the Eighth Amendment, the best
evidence of contemporary values is current legislation.168
Legislatures respond to the will of the people, not courts,169 and
punishment is about legislative policy.170
In spite of the dissent’s strong language, the law changed.
Even though individual states had used intellectual disabilities
Id. at 318.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 319 (recognizing the death penalty should apply to “a narrow category of the
most serious crimes”).
165 Id. at 320.
166 Id. at 322, 342.
167 Id. at 322.
168 Id. at 322–23.
169 Id. at 323.
170 Id.
161
162
163
164
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as a factor to consider in assessing punishment, the Court
determined that the risk of false confessions, the reduced ability
to show mitigating factors, and a reduced capacity to assist
counsel all supported a conclusion that executing persons with
intellectual disabilities would violate the Eighth Amendment to
the Constitution. What the Court could not address, as it had
nothing to do with the issues presented, was how Atkins had
access to a firearm at all. Without that firearm, Eric Nesbitt
could not have been shot eight times.
III. FALLING BETWEEN THE CRACKS
The Gun Control Act of 1968 prohibits transfer of a firearm
to, or possession of a firearm by, minors and felons and persons
with mental illness or who have been adjudicated mentally
defective.171 In the recent Supreme Court cases that have—
finally—addressed the Second Amendment, not only did no one
question this area (it was not before the Court), but Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority in Heller, noted that some of
these prohibitions are almost presumed to be Constitutional:
Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not
unlimited. . . . Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical
analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in
our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions
on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools
and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.172

Thus, the limitation in the Gun Control Act prohibiting
transfer of firearms to persons with mental illness appears to be
an acceptable limitation to the recognized Second Amendment
right to possess a handgun in one’s home for self-defense
purposes.173
Justice Scalia does not, however, offer any
explanation for this conclusion, only that the regulation is
presumptively lawful.174
Of course, as is common, the group referenced in Heller was
persons with mental illness—not those with intellectual
disabilities.175 This serves as another example of how those with
intellectual disabilities are seemingly included in the Gun
Control Act yet are also ignored as part of the groups who are
18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (2006).
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008). See generally cases
cited supra note 3.
173 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27.
174 See id.; see also Rostron, Protecting, supra note 32, at 387.
175 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626; see 18 U.S.C. § 922.
171
172
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prohibited from possessing guns. But because “adjudicated as a
mental defective or has been committed to any mental
institution” is stated together, as a phrase, in the Act, it would
appear the treatment of one identified special risk group (those
with mental illness) applies to the other (those with intellectual
disabilities). The problem, though, is that this is unclear. Not
only is this lack of clarity a problem for dealers, who must
determine to whom they may sell firearms, but it is also a
problem for society.
Not discussed specifically by Justice Scalia in the Heller
opinion, though, was the prohibition pertaining to minors. In
spite of legislation specifying age restrictions regarding firearms
existing in every state, many states knew that such a limitation
was not enough and that a gap existed between the goal of
preventing minors from possessing firearms—and harming
someone—and actual enforcement.176 After all, the Act covers
only the transfer from a firearms dealer. Nothing prevented the
private transfer.
Thus, many states enacted child-access
prevention laws.177 The same gap exists, though, for persons
with intellectual disabilities. The gun used by Daryl Renard
Atkins to shoot Eric Nesbitt came from somewhere. Therefore,
legislation similar to CAP laws should be in place that would

176 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.210 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-311 (2000);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.06(2) (West 2011). This and many other restrictions involved
in state gun policy remain prime for challenges after Heller and McDonald. See, e.g.,
Derek P. Langhauser, Gun Regulation on Campus: Understanding Heller and Preparing
for Subsequent Litigation and Legislation, 36 J.C. & U.L. 63, 66 (2009); Brannon P.
Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Heller, High Water(mark?) Lower Courts and the New
Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1245 (2009). Although neither
Heller nor McDonald clarified how future challenges regarding the Second Amendment
rights should be reviewed, courts have begun to establish a standard of review. The
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny in its
opinion in which it upheld the constitutionality of a ban against assault weapons and
high-capacity magazines. Heller v. District of Columbia, No. 10-7036, 2011 WL 4551558,
at *10, *13–15 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 4, 2011). The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit adopted a standard of review similar to that used in First Amendment
challenges:
First, a severe burden on the core Second Amendment right of armed selfdefense will require an extremely strong public-interest justification and a
close fit between the government’s means and its end. Second, laws
restricting activity lying closer to the margins of the Second Amendment
right, laws that merely regulate rather than restrict, and modest burdens
on the right may be more easily justified. How much more easily depends
on the relative severity of the burden and its proximity to the core of the
right.
Ezell v. City of Chicago, No. 10-3525, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 14108, at *59 (7th Cir. July
6, 2011) (case to be published at 651 F.3d 684). The court determined that requiring
training to be eligible to possess firearms is improper when the city also banned such
training facilities from within the city limits. Id. at *61–62.
177 See supra text accompanying note 55.
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criminalize allowing a person with intellectual disabilities access
to one’s personally owned firearm.
A. Clarifying the Gun Control Act
The first step in addressing the cracks between Heller and
Atkins is to clarify the language in the Gun Control Act.178 The
Act prohibits possession of firearms by persons adjudicated as a
mental defect.179 This, though, does not solve the concern that
the wrong persons may possess guns.
First, at issue is the need for an adjudication. Nothing
requires persons with an intellectual disability to be assigned
guardianship. Many people who live with intellectual disabilities
but who have no family involved in their lives are simply wards
of the state; this does not mean, though, that anyone has become
guardian of their person or estate.
As personal experience, the author spent over seven years
working with persons with intellectual disabilities. Although
some of her clients had legal guardians, not all did—not even
those with severe and profound diagnoses. This confuses the
public, who seem to believe that if someone has an intellectual
disability, the person will have been assigned a guardian by the
court, but that required a person to petition the court and to be
willing to be that guardian.
For example, a dentist, upon determining that a client
needed sedation to receive a dental cleaning, requested an
informed consent be signed by the client’s guardian, as the client
had an IQ measured probably between 40 and 55. When told
that the client did not have a guardian, the dentist, surely
attempting to be diligent, requested paperwork as proof. Trying
hard not to be too glib, but wanting to make the point, the author
asked the dentist if he carried paperwork to prove he was his
own guardian. He did not, of course.180

178 The recommendations here are aimed at federal legislation. States too, though,
would benefit from amending their legislation to adequately address similar gaps.
179 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
180 As based on the author’s personal experience working for a decade with persons
with mental illness and intellectual disabilities, when a person lives in an in-patient
treatment setting, typically a group such as a Human Rights Commission is established
to review all issues related to treatment and care when those issues could infringe on
human rights, such as the decision to subject the patient or resident to medical
procedures, prescribed psychotropic medications, and behavioral modification programs.
See, e.g., 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 5.406(d) (requiring approval of HRC for implementation
of behavioral modification programs); Division of Developmental Disabilities, Human
Rights Committee, DSHS 3 (May 1, 2009), http://www.dshs.wa.gov/pdf/adsa/ddd/policies/
policy5.10.pdf (describing the role of the HRC).
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But the Gun Control Act prohibits possession by persons
only if they have been adjudicated mental defect.181 The Federal
Firearms Regulations clarify that such adjudication can be by “a
court, board, commission, or other lawful authority,” but that
determination must also include a finding that the person is
either a danger or unable to contract and manage her own
affairs.182 With managing one’s finances as the ultimate measure
of independence, that is one area advocates for persons with
intellectual disabilities want to remove only when absolutely
necessary. However, that is not to say the capacity for actually
doing so, without assistance, exists.
When a person enters into a contract, that person can void
the agreement if proven that at the time of the contract, the
person did not have the capacity required.183 In other words, the
burden is on the party without diminished capacity to assure
that the one with whom she is contracting actually has the
capacity to do so. The law should be similar for dealers of
firearms.
Granted, there is no capacity identification system, and
there should not be. But if dealers were required to ensure a
person had the capacity, then we could reduce any risk that a
person with a statistically significant limitation in intelligence
could not purchase a firearm.
Alas, implementing some database that lists persons with
intellectual disabilities is not ideal. Groups who advocate for the
rights of the intellectually disabled would certainly object to such
information for fear of discrimination regarding housing, rights
to marry, etc. And such fears surely are not unfounded. Thus,
one way to address issues of persons with intellectual disabilities
having access to firearms is to target the privately-owned arms.
This, it is presumed, is a more common way firearms are
obtained.
B. Access Prevention Laws
In his dissent in Atkins, Justice Scalia disagreed that a
person with intellectual disabilities should not be subject to the
death penalty.184 He believed culpability should be analyzed by
each jury individually.185 However, he also agreed that in his

18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4).
27 C.F.R. § 478.11.2 (2011).
See Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 10 (1984).
184 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 350 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
185 See id. at 350–51.
181
182
183
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experience, those with intellectual disabilities are childlike and
more likely to behave innocently than brutally.186 But the key
quality that the majority of the Court focused on was the reduced
culpability. It was not about any conclusion that most people
with intellectual disabilities would not be likely to behave
brutally; the issue was that the ones who did should not be
viewed as culpable. Similarly, it is not that we think all children
will commit violent acts, it is just that the ones who do are not as
culpable as adults who do.187
If we look at the decision to draw lines based on age, we can
see why lines need to be drawn based on intelligence, especially
when we are dealing with intelligence that is measured
statistically and significantly below the average. Applying this to
gun control is not about reducing one’s criminal liability as the
Court did in Atkins. Instead, this is about protecting society.
But with the holes in the national system of information and
because we do not, and likely cannot,188 have a complete list of all
persons who have intellectual disabilities, we need a back-up
method for this protection.
A risk exists, though, in comparing a person with intellectual
disabilities to a person who is a minor. Groups that advocate for
persons with intellectual disabilities are quick to dissuade
making such comparisons, and it certainly is devaluing to an
adult to say she has child-like qualities, more so to say the
person is child-like. This issue, though, focuses on the reasoning
capability of persons. Those with a significantly reduced capacity
to reason and foresee a consequence of behavior should not have
firearms.
The Court has recognized and acknowledged that maturity
and age is a factor that should be considered in assessing
punishment. “[A] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense
of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and
Id.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551 (2005) (holding that the execution of persons
who committed a crime under the age of eighteen is a violation of the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment). The Court compared
Roper to Atkins, noting that one of the primary factors it relied on in Atkins—the increase
in the number of states that had adopted prohibitions against executing those with
intellectual disabilities—did not exist in a similar fashion for deciding the issue of
whether persons who were juveniles at the time of the crime should be executed, noting
sixteen states had made the change in Atkins but only five in Roper. Id. at 565. However,
the Court pointed out the significant point was the direction of the change. Id. at 565–66.
188 The author is incredibly uncomfortable with the thought of a national database of
all persons who have intellectual disabilities. This could be used to remove additional
rights or to increase discrimination, neither of which are acceptable consequences. Thus,
the access prevention law may be the better method for protecting society and persons
with intellectual disabilities.
186
187
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are more understandable among the young. These qualities often
result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.”
“[Youth] is a time . . . when a person may be most susceptible to
influence . . . .
[M]inors . . . generally are less mature and
responsible than adults.”189 Furthermore, adolescents are not as
able to control their conduct as adults, nor are they able to think
in long-range terms.190 It is the capacity to rationalize, to
understand consequences, and to be influenced that makes us
treat juveniles differently than adults. It is this same reason we
accept, without challenge, other limits on juveniles such as gun
possession and driving.
And it is those reasons that we must consider the stronger
protection for society and persons with disabilities by making
access prevention laws apply not only to children, but also to
persons with intellectual disabilities. The Court has stated that
“[m]ental retardation . . . diminishes personal culpability even if
the offender can distinguish right from wrong.”191 When it comes
to criminal culpability, we look at the person’s ability to make
decisions and judge actions. We should do the same for gun
possession.
The Gun Control Act prohibits dealers from selling firearms
to underage persons—no rifles or shotguns to anyone under age
eighteen, and no other type of firearm to one under twenty-one
years of age.192
Rarely in the debate is this prohibition
questioned. We ban use of alcohol based on age,193 and states
base driving privileges on age.194 Age is a bright-line cut-off
where, magically, rights or privileges are bestowed upon reaching
a certain birthday.
And many states hold persons criminally liable when the
adult, in legal possession of a firearm, allows a child to access
that firearm and an injury results.195 We should have the same
laws regarding persons with intellectual disabilities.
Granted, enacting legislation that criminalizes allowing
access by a person with an intellectual disability to one’s
189 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 834 (1988) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982)).
190 Id. (quoting Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115 n.11). Penry’s doctor in 1973 noted that due
to Penry’s organic brain damage, he “would be subject to influence and manipulation by
people more intelligent or sophisticated than he was.” Brief of Petitioner at 44, Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (No. 87-6177).
191 Roper, 543 U.S. at 563 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002)).
192 18 U.S.C. § 922 (b) (2006).
193 23 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2000).
194 See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 12814.6 (Deering 2000); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-24-3-2
(West 2004); TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 521.204 (West 2007).
195 See supra note 56.
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personally-owned firearm is not the entire solution: we should
address the issue regarding the definition and information
available to firearm dealers as well. And the burden on the
private owner is heavy: she must know if the visitor coming into
her house has an intellectual disability—one of the areas even
the Court struggled with in not applying the death penalty after
one’s IQ is known. This proposal requires the private gun owner
to be aware of anyone in her home who might gain access to her
gun. If it could be a minor, she must prevent that access. If the
person might have an intellectual disability, so too should she
prevent any access.
Of course, the firearms dealer need only check the NICS
database, and if the person with an intellectual disability who is
attempting to purchase a gun is listed in the NICS, the dealer
simply refuses to conduct the transaction. But there is no similar
NICS system to use when allowing guests into one’s home.
Then again, a private owner of firearms should know more
about who is in her house. And if she is unsure, all she need do
is safely store her firearm. After all, a firearm owner may be
unaware if her child’s friend is above or below the specified age in
the CAP law, but the liability would be the same. But this is
irrelevant. The CAP laws do not impose some sort of strict
liability regarding a minor accessing one’s firearm. Instead, all
but a very few are clear on proper storage that would exculpate
one from criminal liability. The same should apply to any
extended legislation.
Additionally, this legislation not only would encourage safe
storage of firearms by the individual owner, this would add a
layer of punishment and an extra crime to anyone who might use
a person with intellectual disabilities as a tool in committing
crimes. Many persons with intellectual disabilities are easier to
persuade and very eager to please those believed to be friends.
Perhaps if the mere providing the weapon to a person with an
intellectual disability were a crime, any such person who did so
could be more likely to be found guilty of a crime and punished,
with proof easier than that of accomplice or conspiratorial
liability.
CONCLUSION
The problem surrounding gun legislation is not so much the
guns as it is who has the guns. As is often said, “guns don’t kill
people; people kill people.” The Supreme Court has recognized
that many long-standing prohibitions are surely constitutional,
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even in light of recent decisions.196 But these prohibitions are not
without holes in coverage and implementation. And the holes,
when we consider the Court’s treatment of and our reduced
culpability attributed to persons with intellectual disabilities,
form cracks in legislation. Our aim needs to be to avoid allowing
anyone to fall in these cracks.
The person with intellectual disabilities does not rationalize
the same as one without these limitations, nor does she foresee
the consequences of all of her acts. If we have determined that,
therefore, she is not to be punished in the same manner as
others, then we should also work to prevent crimes that we can—
to protect the less-culpable person from being in that situation.
This applies especially to gun possession, targeting reducing
crimes and acts committed with such a deadly weapon.
The current prohibition against a person adjudicated as
mental defect does not go far enough. Adjudication is not as
common as many believe, and this leaves a vast population of
people eligible to purchase a gun. This hole should be closed by
removing the requirement for adjudication if a person has
intellectual disabilities. Not only might such a prohibition
protect persons with intellectual disabilities, but it might also
allow better, more consistent treatment. So often when someone
with an intellectual disability uses that as part of his defense or
as a mitigating factor, public perception and doubt create an
additional hurdle. Even in Penry, in the prosecution of a man
with an IQ of 56, after the Supreme Court sent John Paul Penry’s
case back for another trial, the Texas Attorney General noted his
doubt of Penry’s disabilities: “Penry is ‘a schemer, a planner and
can be purposefully deceptive.’”197
Conversations about gun control lead to heated debates,
strong opinions, and bantered statistics. The sides that normally
cite civil liberties often change their tone when it comes to issues
of gun use under the Second Amendment, while those who favor
fewer
restrictions
on
gun
possession
argue
about
constitutionality and against states’ rights to control. However
we define gun legislation—as control or rights—we need to better
define who falls under restrictions. Failing to do so leaves open
categories of citizens who should not possess or use firearms.
The solution is to seek another approach: criminalize
allowing access. This will not prevent all access of firearms by
persons with reduced criminal culpability, but it is a step in the
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008).
Top Court Stops Controversial Execution, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009, 9:35 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2000/11/17/deathpenalty/main250352.shtml.
196
197
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right direction. Assuming, as the jury decided, that Daryl
Renard Atkins did shoot Eric Nesbitt eight times, he could not
have done so had he not had a gun.

